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INTRODUCTION

Why are conspiracy theories so popular? Above and beyond “the
Gödel Conspiracy,”1 the focus of this paper, there are conspiracy theories on
just about every conceivable topic or controversy. Whether it be JFK or 9/11,
chemtrails or the origins of the crack cocaine epidemic, the integrity of the
NBA draft lottery or Ronaldo’s poor performance in the 1998 World Cup, no
anomaly is too small or too big to merit its own conspiracy theory.2
At it happens, even a mind as logical and rigorous as Kurt Gödel’s
was not immune to conspiracy thinking. Gödel, the greatest logician since
Aristotle,3 posited the existence of a centuries-long conspiracy to conceal the
work of German polymath Gottfried Leibniz. Among other things, Leibniz is
known for his co-discovery—independently of Sir Isaac Newton—of the
calculus,4 for his metaphysical theory of monads,5 and for his “best of all
possible worlds” doctrine,6 but according to Gödel, the target of this secret
plot was Leibniz’s single-most revolutionary idea, one that may have
inspired Gödel’s own landmark contributions to mathematics and logic—
Leibniz’s proposed universal language or characteristica universalis.7 So,
did a small circle of sinister scholars try to suppress Leibniz’s most important
idea?
The remainder of this Article will be organized as follows: Part II,
by way of background, retells the story of Gödel’s conspiracy theory. By all
accounts,8 Gödel had invented this obscure but intriguing conspiracy after

1

See especially Parts II & III, infra.
For a two-volume encyclopedia of conspiracy theories in North American
history, see Knight (2003). For a more up-to-date collection of conspiracy theories,
see the popular Reddit thread r/Conspiracy. Similarly, the crowd-sourced editors of
Wikipedia have also compiled an inventory of hundreds of contemporary conspiracy
theories. See List of Conspiracy Theories and List of Political Conspiracies in
Wikipedia.
3
Wang (2001), p. 7.
4
See Pappas (1997), pp. 115-120. Today, Leibniz’s system of notation is
generally preferred over Newton’s when the calculus is taught to students.
5
In Leibniz's system of metaphysics, monads are basic substances that make up
the universe but lack spatial extension and hence are immaterial. See Rescher
(1991); Cover & O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999).
6
See Rutherford (1998). Leibniz’s “best of all possible worlds” doctrine was
famously criticized by the French Enlightenment philosopher Voltaire in his satirical
novella Candide.
7
See Wang (1990), pp. 310-311; Dawson (1997), p. 263.
8
See generally Menger (1994), pp. 222-224. See also Dawson (1997), p. 107;
Rescher (2011), Ch. 13; Various (2017).
2
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spending countless hours researching the works of Leibniz and discovering
significant gaps in Leibniz’s published works. Next, using Franz Neumann’s
classic work on “Anxiety and Politics” as a point of departure, Part III
explores the internal logic of Gödel’s conspiracy theory.
Part IV then surveys a wide variety of “conspiracy theory theories”
to see how such a logical and rigorous thinker as Kurt Gödel could have
fallen for a conspiracy theory himself, while Part V reviews some recent
proposals for combatting conspiracy theories or mitigating their negative
effects. Part V also explains why these proposed solutions are either
ineffectual or dangerous to democracy. Alternatively, Part VI will propose a
novel solution: the creation of a retrodiction market. In brief, instead of
trying to censor or suppress conspiracy theories, why not allow people to bet
on them? A betting market would aggregate all available information about
the truth-values of various conspiracy theories by allowing bettors to bet on
their beliefs about past events. The Article will then conclude with an
observation from the late Milton Friedman.

II.

THE LEIBNIZ CONSPIRACY

Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) is best known for his landmark
contributions to logic and mathematics, especially his first and second
incompleteness theorems,9 as well as for reportedly discovering a logical
contradiction in the U.S. Constitution.10 In addition, during his years at the
Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS) in Princeton, New Jersey, Gödel’s
interests also turned to philosophy and physics. Among other things, Gödel
admired the works of Gottfried Leibniz and studied them closely, “devoting
endless hours to the study of Leibniz.”11 At some point during his studies,
Gödel postulated the existence of a hostile conspiracy that had caused some
of Leibniz’s works to be concealed or destroyed.12 In the words of one of
Gödel’s biographers, Rebecca Goldstein, Gödel “came to believe that there
9

See generally Kreisel (1980).
See generally Guerra-Pujol (2013), which surveys the various accounts of
Gödel’s alleged discovery of a contradiction or loophole in the Constitution.
11
Yourgrau (2005), p. 182. Also, for a brief summary of Leibniz’s contributions
to logic and mathematics, see Dawson (1997), p. 39. In addition, Dawson (1997, p.
237) explains the relevance of Leibniz’s ideas to Gödel’s First Incompleteness
Theorem. The First Incompleteness Theorem first appeared as “Theorem VI” in
Gödel’s 1931 paper “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia
Mathematica and Related Systems I.” See Gödel (1931), translated in Heijenoort
(1967).
12
See Menger (1994), pp. 222-223.
10
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was a vast conspiracy, apparently in place for centuries, to suppress the truth
[about Leibniz’s writings] and make men stupid.”13
That Gödel, one of the most logical and rigorous thinkers of all time,
was himself a proponent of such a far-fetched conspiracy theory shows us
how compelling and pervasive conspiracy thinking can be. Gödel’s
biographers, however, have generally dismissed Gödel’s conspiracy theory
out of hand, attributing this episode to Gödel’s “paranoia” or to his many
mental delusions.14 By way of example, one scholar states: “He [Gödel]
suffered delusions and personality disturbances. He became excessively
paranoid, the paranoia deriving, some have conjectured, from his superlogicality and overly intense introspection. He tended to believe in secret
intrigues and conspiracies.”15 Another scholar speculates that it was Gödel’s
intellectual isolation, especially after the death in 1955 of his best friend
Albert Einstein, that “provided fertile soil for that rationality run amuck
which is paranoia.”16
While it is tempting to dismiss this conspiracy theory as the product
of a paranoid mind, such an ad hominem psychological explanation is too
easy. After all, Gödel was not only a world-renowned logician; he had also
devoted “endless hours” of study to Leibniz’s works.17 In fact, Gödel may
have first encountered the works of Leibniz as early as 1926, while he was
still a student at the University of Vienna.18 According to Karl Menger, a
credible source who knew Kurt Gödel personally from their days together in
Vienna, Gödel “had been most intensely interested in Leibniz”19 and “he
keenly desired to inspect Leibniz’ unpublished manuscripts and not only out

13

Goldstein (2005), p. 48, internal quotation marks omitted.
See ibid., p. 48; see also Pappas (1997), pp. 115-120; Dawson (1997), p. 107
& p. 137; Yourgrau (2005), p. 15.
15
Davis (1997).
16
Goldstein (2005), p. 48. It is worth noting, however, that Gödel postulated this
worldwide anti-Leibniz conspiracy as early as 1939, when Gödel was at the height
of his mental powers. See Menger (1994), pp. 222-223.
17
Yourgrau (2005), p. 182. In addition, Karl Menger has attested that Gödel had
become deeply involved in the study of Leibniz. See Dawson (1997), p. 107. See
also ibid., p. 166: “That the study of Leibniz was the primary focus of Gödel’s
attention during the years 1944-45 is attested both by IAS Bulletin nos. 11 and 12
and by entries in Morgenstern’s diary.” (Oskar Morgenstern and Gödel were both
faculty members at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, and
by all accounts, they were close friends for many decades.)
18
Dawson (1997), p. 39.
19
Menger (1994), p. 71.
14
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of historical interest ….”20
But to fully appreciate and assess the plausibility of this alleged
conspiracy, we must revisit one of Leibniz’s most ambitious and
revolutionary ideas and the supposed target of this secret cover-up—the
characteristica universalis—an idea that must have captured Gödel’s
imagination, for in the words of one scholar:
Gödel was fascinated by Leibniz’s ideas, to the point that others
felt he was obsessed: he checked out every book on Leibniz from
his university library. He believed (correctly, I would say) that
Leibniz’s most important ideas (the characteristica universalis)
had been nearly forgotten by society; but he also believed that
this was due to a shadowy conspiracy meant to prevent the
intellectual advancement of mankind.21
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the most
important logicians, mathematicians, and natural philosophers of his time.
Although his most well-known contributions to the world of ideas include
his discovery of differential and integral calculus, he also attempted to
develop a universal logic of science and human reasoning. Specifically,
Leibniz wanted to “reduce everything from imagination to analysis,”22 or in
the words of one Leibniz scholar: “Leibniz dreamt all his life of developing
a ‘characteristica universalis’—a kind of ‘algebra of thought’ that would
mechanize any form of factual reasoning as algebra had mechanized
geometrical thought.”23
To the point, Leibniz was convinced that all human ideas could be
reduced to a few primitive thoughts, or in the words of another Leibniz
scholar, “If it were possible to map these primitive thoughts unambiguously
to a list of characters, then either no one using these characters in reasoning
and writing would ever err, or he or she would recognize these errors with
the help of [the] most simple checks.”24 To accomplish this ambitious project,
Leibniz developed the concept of a characteristica universalis, the
foundation of his general model for logical reasoning.25 Or in the immortal
20

Ibid., p. 210.
Summers Stay (2012).
22
Leibniz (1690e), quoted in Blåsjö (2017), p. 14 & p. 218, n.17.
23
Blåsjö (2017), p. 14.
24
Peckhaus (2004), p. 6.
25
Leibniz’s work draws a distinction between a lingua characterica (or
characteristica universalis), a universal language of thought, and a calculus
ratiocinator, a calculus of reasoning. See generally Pechkaus, ibid.
21
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words of Leibniz himself:
We will present here, thus, a new and marvelous calculus, which
occurs in all our reasonings and which is not less rigorous than
arithmetic or algebra. Through this calculus, it is always possible
to terminate that part of a controversy that can be determined
from the data, by simply taking a pen, so that it will suffice for
two debaters (leaving aside issues of agreement about words) to
say to each other: Let us calculate!26
Alas, Leibniz never described the characteristica universalis in
operational detail; as a result, many scholars have dismissed Leibniz’s
project as an absurd fantasy.27 Gödel, however, believed that Leibniz’s
project was feasible. In systematic and methodical fashion, Gödel had
assembled all the relevant works of Leibniz and then noticed a striking
anomaly: a detailed treatment of the characteristica universalis was
conspicuously absent from Leibniz’s surviving works.

III.

THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF GÖDEL’S CONSPIRACY
THEORY

This Article will now explore the inner logic of the Gödel Conspiracy
using Franz Neumann’s essay “Anxiety and Politics” as a point of departure.
In his classic essay, Neumann identifies three features that all conspiracy
theories or alternate realities have in common: “intensification of anxiety
through manipulation, identification, [and] false concreteness.”28 The first of
these elements—anxiety—refers to the psychological aspect of alternate
realities: who is most likely to fall for a conspiracy theory? The last two
elements—identification and false concreteness—refer to the content or

26

Leibniz (1875–1890), vol. 7, pp. 64-65; translation from Dascal (2008), p. 41,
quoted in Blåsjö (2017), p. 14 & p. 218, n.18. The original reads as follows: “Itaque
profertur hic calculus quidamnovus et mirificus, qui in omnibus nostris
ratiocinationibus locum habet, et qui non minus accurate procedit quam Arithmetica
aut Algebra. Quo adhibito semper terminari possint controversiae quantum ex datis
eas determinari possibile est, manu tantum ad calamum admota, ut sufficiat duos
disputantes omissis verborum concertationibus sibi invicem dicere: calculemus.”
See Blåsjö (2017), 218, n.18.
27
Compare Parkinson (1973), p. ix: “Leibniz’s views about the systematic
character of all knowledge are linked with his plans for a universal symbolism, a
Characteristica Universalis. This was to be a calculus which would cover all
thought, and replace controversy by calculation. The ideal now seems absurdly
optimistic.”
28
Neumann (1957), p. 283.
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internal logic of any given conspiracy theory: the identity of the conspirators
and their nefarious goals. By way of example, let us return to Gödel to
illustrate the internal logic of his conspiracy theory.
Consider the element of false concreteness first. According to Franz
Neumann, there must be an element of truth to some aspect of the conspiracy;
i.e., the conspiracy must be plausible.29 In Gödel’s case, his conspiracy
theory, although unlikely, was not entirely far-fetched, for some of Leibniz’s
writings—specific passages that Leibniz himself had referred to in some of
his works—had apparently gone missing. Karl Menger, for example, reports
at length the following conversation between Oskar Morgenstern and Gödel:
Later, I once discussed Gödel’s ideas on Leibniz with a common
friend, the economist Oskar Morgenstern. He described to me
how Gödel one day took him into the Princeton University
Library and piled up two stacks of publications: on one side,
books and articles that appeared during or shortly after Leibniz’
lifetime and contained exact references to writings of the
philosopher published in collections or series (with places and
years of publication, volume and page numbers, etc.); on the
other side, those very collections or series. But in some cases,
neither on the cited page nor elsewhere was there any writing by
Leibniz; in other cases, the series broke off just before the cited
volume or the volume ended before the cited page; in still other
cases, the volumes containing the cited writings never appeared.
“The material was really highly astonishing,” Morgenstern
said.30
Although Menger’s statement is hearsay, since he is reporting on
what a third party (Morgenstern) told him, his hearsay testimony, if true,
presents a genuine mystery about some of Leibniz’s writings. After all, it was
not just one obscure reference or a few isolated passages of Leibniz’s that
went missing; it was a large collection of them consisting of “two stacks”!
Moreover, Gödel did not simply imagine or conjure up the existence of some
long-lost Leibnizian manuscript, a mythical Holy Grail of philosophical
legend. Instead, Gödel had done a meticulous amount of research,
assembling two stacks’ worth of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
materials with “exact references” to specific writings and passages of
Leibniz—passages that had disappeared completely, despite the existence of
29
30

Ibid., pp. 283-287.
Menger (1994), pp. 223-224.
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such precise references to those writings. Perhaps one or two lost references
would be just a coincidence, works lost to the ceaseless march of time, but
how do we explain the disappearance of such a large collection of Leibniz’s
writings?
The second feature of conspiracy theories is what Neumann refers to
as identification. In other words, the alleged conspirators must belong to a
specific and identifiable target or enemy group. Neumann himself identifies
five such common targets or enemy groups: Jesuits, Freemasons,
Communists, Capitalists, and Jews.31 But regardless of whether the
conspirators are Jesuits or Jews, Neumann’s point is that the conspiracy in
question must be orchestrated by members of an identifiable group.
In Gödel’s case, who were the members of his alleged conspiracy?
Once again, Karl Menger provides a possible clue as to the identity of
Gödel’s conspirators: the House of Hapsburg in Austria. And this time,
Menger’s report does not consist of second-hand hearsay; it is a first-hand
account of a personal conversation with Gödel himself:
Meanwhile, Gödel was more and more preoccupied with
Leibniz. He was now completely convinced that important
writings of this philosopher had not only failed to be published,
but were destroyed in manuscript. Once I said to him teasingly,
“You have a vicarious persecution complex on Leibniz’ behalf.”
Soon afterwards he said, “There is something I have wanted to
ask you for quite a while. When was the Viennese (now
Austrian) Academy of Sciences founded?” I immediately
suspected what Gödel was after. It is a historical fact that Leibniz
negotiated for a time with the Emperor and his government about
the founding of an Academy in Vienna, but that the negotiations
came to nothing.32
According to Menger’s account, Gödel believed as a matter of
“historical fact” that Leibniz was negotiating directly with the House of
Habsburg for the creation of a special academic institution to be located in
the imperial city of Vienna, the implication being that Leibniz’s works would
have been stored in this place. Apparently, however, Gödel had further
reason to believe that these talks between Leibniz and the Habsburgs became
acrimonious and that—when these contentious negotiations fell through—
someone, perhaps acting under the direct orders of the Emperor of Austria31
32

Neumann (1957), p. 283.
Menger (1994), pp. 222-223.
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Hungary himself, must have acted in retaliation by destroying some of
Leibniz’s writings.
Lastly, Neumann refers to “anxiety” or to the psychological aspect
of conspiracy theories. But is it helpful to think of conspiracy theories as a
kind of disease or mental disorder? If not, how can one explain the popularity
and power of conspiracy thinking generally?

IV.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF CONSPIRACY THEORY THEORIES

Why are some people more likely than others to fall for conspiracy
theories in the first place? A wide variety of possible explanations are
explored below.

A. Social and Psychological Explanations
Franz Neumann’s classic work on conspiracy theories,33 with its
focus on anxiety and politics, has opened up a veritable Pandora’s box of
competing psychological and social explanations.34 A recent comprehensive
survey of the literature, for example, concludes that conspiracy beliefs are
due to “a range of psychological, political, and social factors.”35 Similarly,
another study examines the link between “societal crisis situations” and
“belief in conspiracy theories” and blames “fear, uncertainty, and the feeling
of being out of control” for “increasing the likelihood of perceiving
conspiracies in social situations.”36 Yet another study highlights the role the
epistemic, existential, and social motives play in driving the popularity of
conspiracy theories.37
The problem with such explanations, however, aside from the fact
that sometimes conspiracies are true,38 is that they are ad hoc. Simply put, by
blaming conspiracy thinking on such a wide variety of social and

33

Neumann (1957). See Part III, supra.
By way of example, one early study (Goertzel, 1994; n = 348) concludes that
“belief in conspiracies [is] correlated with anomia.” By contrast, another study
(Oliver & Wood, 2014; n = 1935) blames “a Manichean worldview,” concluding that
“the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a
willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to
Manichean narratives.”
35
Douglas, et al. (2020).
36
See van Prooijen & Douglas (2017).
37
Douglas, et al. (2017).
38
For an in-depth example of a far-fetched but real conspiracy, see Holiday
(2018), describing an “unbelievable conspiracy” led by billionaire tech investor Peter
Thiel against the popular Internet media outlet Gawker. See also Kolbert (2019).
34
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psychological factors and motives, these explanations are too comprehensive
to be of much value. Worse yet, some commentators, in their zeal to blame
conspiracy theories on “bad thinking”39 or “cognitive quirks,”40 come
perilously close to committing the ad hominem fallacy.41 In any case, the
argument that “only bad thinkers believe in conspiracies” is not only
tautological; it is also false, as the Gödel Conspiracy itself demonstrates.
Before proceeding, it is worth asking: Why do so many conspiracytheory researchers resort to such ad hoc explanations or to questioning the
intelligence or rationality of conspiracy believers? Perhaps it is the result of
our general inability to cast aside our own personal or normative views about
conspiracy theories, or in the words of one scholar, “the academic treatment
of [conspiracy theories] has frequently been characterized by the
preconceived notion of conspiracy theories as morally ‘wrong’ ….”42 43
Accordingly, the remainder of this Article will present some alternative and
more promising “conspiracy theory theories” before turning to possible
solutions.

B. Foucault and the Archeology of Conspiracies
What if we were to extend Foucauldian discourse analysis to
conspiracy theories?44 The original focus of discourse theory—an influential
research agenda and qualitative method of social analysis developed by such
pioneers as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and many others—was on the

39

Compare, for example, Cassam (2015), who blames “bad thinking” for the
rise of conspiracy thinking.
40
Compare Rogers & Mithani (2021), who identify various “cognitive quirks,”
along with social media exposure, as the cause of conspiracy theories.
41
The ad hominem fallacy occurs when, instead of addressing someone’s
argument or position, one mounts an attack on his appearance, on his moral
character, or on some other irrelevant personal attribute. See, e.g., Tindale (2007), p.
82. That is, instead of addressing the merits of popular conspiracy theories,
contemporary researchers often end up dismissing or rejecting such theories out of
hand, finding some psychological fault or mental defect as the underlying source of
conspiracy thinking.
42
Streicher (2020), p. 281. Or perhaps our falling into this fallacious trap is due
to simple sociological factors. After all, most scholars have doctoral or other
advanced academic degrees, so how can anyone blame us for looking down on
conspiracy theorists from our Ivory Towers, for seeing them as gullible dupes or
irrational ignorami?
43
As a further aside, I self-consciously use the pronouns our and us as I, too, am
a member of this research community.
44
Compare Steicher (2020), who does just that.
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non-linear relationships between language, knowledge, and power.45 For
Foucault and his post-modern followers, the term discourse refers to the
different ways in which we express knowledge and embody power
relationships. On this view, conspiracy theories are just a special type of
socially constructed discourse: a subversive form of social knowledge
existing alongside many other competing forms of knowledge.46
Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective, the shadowy and subversive
nature of most conspiracy theories is a feature, not a bug. Moreover, this postmodern or Foucauldian view of conspiracy theories contains an
epistemologically novel and revolutionary insight, one that is especially
relevant to the murky and shadowy world of secret plots and concealed
cabals: truth is a subjective and contested concept. That is, the truth is rarely,
if ever, an absolute value; it is always up for grabs.47 The focus of
Foucauldian discourse theory is thus on who is doing the speaking because a
given truth—my truth or yours?—will depend on who the speaker is, not just
on what he is saying.
Put another way, given the subjective and contested nature of truth,
the probability or truth-value of any given conspiracy theory is beside the
point. What really matters is the identity of the people or social groups who
happen to believe in that theory as well as the reasons for their subjective
beliefs, however fanciful or far-fetched those beliefs might be.48 So, instead
of asking whether X conspiracy theory is true, we should be asking an entirely
different set of questions, such as:
• Which individuals or groups believe in X conspiracy theory?
• How are these subjective beliefs about X conspiracy theory
socially constructed?
• And, most importantly, what power relationships do these beliefs
embody?
Although these research questions are fruitful ones, discourse
analysis has a fatal flaw. In a word, its Achilles’ heel is that it is self-refuting.
After all, if truth and reality are socially constructed power constructs, then
so too are the results of discourse analysis and discourse theory itself.

45

See generally Kendall & Wickham (1999). See also Wooffitt (2005), pp. 146147; Given (2008), p. 249.
46
See generally Steicher (2020).
47
Compare the notion, which is popular today, of “my truth.” See, e.g., Meyers
(2009).
48
See Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008), pp. 91-108.
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C. Conspiracy Theory Language Games
One possible escape route from this self-refuting Foucauldian
predicament is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea of a language game.49 In his
treatise Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein repeatedly compares
human languages to games and concludes that languages are like games in
that both are rule-governed activities.50 Moreover, for Wittgenstein, the
meaning of words, concepts, sentences, etc. depends on the particular game
or rule-bound activity in which such words are being used.51 To illustrate this
“multiplicity of language-games,”52 Wittgenstein presents a comprehensive
laundry list of such games, a compilation of diverse rule-bound activities
from daily life:
Giving orders, and obeying them –
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its
measurements –
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
Reporting an event –
Speculating about an event –
Forming and testing a hypothesis –
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
Making up a story; and reading it –
Play-acting –
Singing catches –
Guessing riddles –
Making a joke; telling it –
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic –
Translating from one language into another –
Asking, thinking, cursing, greeting, praying.53
So, why not add “conspiracy theories” or “alternate realities” to
Wittgenstein’s laundry list? Although one can only wonder what
Wittgenstein himself would have thought of this possibility, it turns out that
conspiracy theories do resemble many of the specific language games in
Wittgenstein’s list, such as speculating about an event, making up a story, or
49

Wittgenstein (1958).
Ibid., § 3. That is, whether one is speaking a language or playing a game, in
both cases one is engaged in an activity that is governed by general rules and social
conventions.
51
See generally Biletzki & Matar (2021).
52
Wittgenstein (1958), § 23.
53
Ibid.
50
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reporting an event, depending on the use or uses that a particular conspiracy
theory is being put to.
This Wittgensteinian lens is intriguing for two additional reasons.
First off, we don’t need to diagnose or otherwise impugn the mental health
of conspiracy theorists. Instead, we ask a completely different question: What
are the rules of the conspiracy theory language game? Secondly, although
the rules of such language-games might be socially constructed, the
Wittgensteinian approach is not self-refuting because we are not bound by
the rules of a given language game when we are studying that game as an
observer.54
But what, if anything, is gained by comparing conspiracy theories to
language games? Alas, this Wittgensteinian lens poses more questions than
it answers. After all, if a conspiracy theory is like a game, a game with its
own internal logic and its own set of rules, then what are the rules of the
conspiracy theory game? However we answer this question, why do some
conspiracy theories assume a life of their own and spread like wildfire?

D. Conspiracy Theories as Memes
Instead of comparing conspiracy theories to language games, what if
we compared them to cultural replicators or evolutionary memes?55 Richard
Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist who was the first to propose a memetic
theory of cultural evolution in his book The Selfish Gene, coined the term
meme to describe the smallest unit of cultural transmission.56 Textbook
examples of cultural memes include “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes
fashions, ways of making pots or building arches.”57 Using this evolutionary
lens, one could argue that a conspiracy theory is just another type of cultural
meme, one that propagates itself in the meme pool of human culture by
leaping from brain to brain via a process of imitation.
Dawkins identifies three essential features of all successful
replicators, including memes: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity.58
Whether we are describing biological replicators like genes or cultural

54

But see Sellers (1954), p. 204.
Compare Dawkins (1989), p. 192: “Just as genes propagate themselves in the
gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate
themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in
the broad sense, can be called imitation.”
56
Dawkins (1989), pp. 192-201.
57
Ibid., p. 192.
58
Ibid., p. 194.
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replicators like memes, for evolution to occur the replicator must live long
enough to make sufficient copies of itself, and these copies must be highquality ones. Moreover, from a meme’s perspective—i.e., not the perspective
the person who falls for a particular conspiracy theory, but rather the
perspective of the individual meme itself—the successful propagation of any
given meme or conspiracy theory does not depend on its underlying truth
value; instead, successful propagation of a meme depends on its ability to
replicate or make copies of itself.
This meme’s-eye view of conspiracy theories thus explains why farfetched and fringe theories are more likely to propagate in the meme pool of
human brains. Simply put, the more “crazy” or disturbing or far-fetched a
given conspiracy theory is, the more likely it will grab the attention of a
person’s mind and spread to other minds, since people are more likely to
share memorable memes than run-of-the-mill ones. By the same token, this
memetic explanation of conspiracy theories also explains why some
conspiracy theories, like Gödel’s tedious and technical conspiracy theory,
fail to spread and instead languish on the sidelines of human culture.
Nevertheless, aside from the question of their ontological status,59
memes pose another vexing question. What makes far-fetched or fringe
conspiracy theories more memorable or more likely to spread in the first
place?60 After all, just as more plausible scientific theories have generally
replaced less plausible ones in the domain of the natural sciences—think of
astronomy gradually replacing astrology or alchemy giving way to
chemistry—why doesn’t this trend carry over into the world of conspiracy
theories?61

V. WHAT IS THE REMEDY? SOME PROPOSED CURES
Regardless of which “conspiracy theory theory” one prefers—ad hoc
social or psychological explanations, self-refuting Foucaldian discourse
analysis, rule-bound Wittgenstenian language games, or Dawkins’ memetic
lens—what is to be done? Here, the Article will survey several proposals that
59

Compare Guerra-Pujol (2019), p. 15, n.39, who questions whether
evolutionary memes really exist.
60
In other words, it is not good enough to say that conspiracy theories and other
memes have psychological appeal. What we really need to know is why conspiracy
theories have such psychological appeal. Compare Dawkins (1989), p. 193, who
poses this same question with regard to “the idea of a god.”
61
Another problem with the meme’s-eye view of conspiracy theories is that it
reduces people’s agency and free will; it paints conspiracy believers as the passive
receptacles of memes.
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have recently been made to counteract conspiracy thinking. These proposed
remedies, however, are either ineffectual or far worse than the conspiracythinking disease they are supposed to cure.

A. Reality Czars and Cognitive Infiltrators
A rising tide of voices, especially in academia, are calling for more
vigorous measures to combat the spread of conspiracy theories and other
dangerous ideas. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, for example, have
proposed the cognitive infiltration of pro-conspiracy extremist groups; in
their own words: “Our main policy claim here is that government should
engage in cognitive infiltration of the groups that produce conspiracy
theories . . .”62 Others, by contrast, have highlighted the special dangers
posed by the Internet. By way of example, Kevin Roose, a technology
columnist for The New York Times, recently surveyed a group of experts
about social media disinformation.63 According to Roose, these unnamed
experts recommend the Biden administration to appoint a cross-agency task
force “to tackle disinformation and domestic extremism.”64 This proposed
task force would be led by a “reality czar,” who would coordinate the federal
government’s response to conspiracy theories and other forms of
disinformation.65 For Roose, this extreme measure is necessary to avoid a
civil war:
I’ve spent the past several years reporting on our national reality
crisis, and I worry that unless the [federal government] treats
conspiracy theories and disinformation as the urgent threats they
are, our parallel universes will only drift further apart, and the
potential for violent unrest and civic dysfunction will only
grow.66
Seriously? These sundry measures are likely to prove ineffectual at
best or outright dangerous to our democratic ideals at worst. After all, who
will police Sunstein and Vermuele’s cognitive infiltrators to keep them in
check,67 and who is to judge what constitutes disinformation in the first
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Sunstein & Vermeule (2009), p. 218 (emphasis in the original).
See Roose (2021).
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
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Ibid.
67
Compare Sunstein & Vermuele (2009), pp. 218-226, who fail to answer this
all-important question.
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place? Is the government well-suited to perform either of these tasks?68
Simply put, reality czars and cognitive infiltrators run the risk of stifling free
speech and suffocating the marketplace of ideas.69 Is there a less dangerous
way of combatting conspiracy theories?

B. Douthat’s Razor: Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously
Ross Douthat, a columnist for The New York Times, invites us to take
conspiracy theories “a little more seriously” rather than rejecting them out of
hand,70 and he makes two additional points that are worth considering further:
conspiracy theories are often “ineradicable” regardless of the medium in
which they spread (Internet, word-of-mouth, etc.),71 and sometimes such
theories are “a reasonable response to both elite failures and the fact that
conspiracies and cover-ups often do exist.”72
Furthermore, Douthat formulates a sophisticated four-part test for
deciding which alleged conspiracies to keep an open mind about, “a tool kit
for discriminating among different fringe ideas.”73 In brief, Douthat’s
conspiracy-theory tool kit consists of the following four criteria: (1) “Prefer
simple theories to baroque ones,” (2) “Avoid theories that seem tailored to
fit a predetermined conclusion,” (3) “Take fringe theories more seriously
when the mainstream narrative has holes,” and (4) “Just because you start to
believe in one fringe theory, you don’t have to believe them all.”74 75 Alas,
the Gödel Conspiracy, as far-fetched and improbable as it was, would have
passed Douthat’s multi-part test with flying colors.

1. Simplicity
Douthat’s first criterion can be restated in Occam’s Razor terms as
68

As a thought-experiment, ask yourself: If Donald J. Trump were to win reelection in 2024, who would his cognitive infiltrators or reality czar be?
69
Compare Coase (1974), who analogizes markets in goods to markets in ideas.
But see the theoretical objections to the marketplace of ideas metaphor in Part VI.D,
infra.
70
Douthat (2021).
71
Ibid. Or to paraphrase the immortal words of General Douglas MacArthur
(1951): “Conspiracy theories never die; they just fade away.”
72
Douthat (2021).
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid. These four quotations are from the subheadings in Douthat’s op-ed essay.
75
As a further aside, Douthat’s criteria appear to be inspired by a branch of the
philosophy of science called theory choice. The giants of this field are Karl Popper
(2002) and Thomas Kuhn (1996). For other approaches to theory choice, See
Thagard (1978) and Welch (2013).
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follows: prefer simpler conspiracy theories to more complex ones.76 In other
words, when one is presented with competing explanations of the same event
(e.g., the disappearance of some of Leibniz’s writings, the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, Germany’s defeat in World War I, etc.), one
should select the simplest explanation or the explanation with the fewest
assumptions.77 Either way, whether we define simplicity in terms of the
number of background assumptions or in terms of how nature or the world
operates, we could also frame the simplicity criterion in probabilistic terms,
since one of the rationales for this preference for parsimony is a probabilistic
one: the idea that the simplest explanation is most likely to be the correct one.
But what does “simpler” mean in the domain of alternate realities or
conspiracy theories? Does simplicity refer to the number of conspirators?
The goal of the conspiracy? The number of steps necessary for the conspiracy
to succeed? However we answer the foregoing questions, one of the supreme
ironies of many conspiracy theories is that they pass this parsimony test with
flying colors, for they are often far more simpler and parsimonious than the
truth. By way of illustration, consider the Gödel Conspiracy. After devoting
“endless hours” to the study of Leibniz,78 Gödel discovered that many of
Leibniz’s works were missing. How can it be—in the absence of a concerted
effort by a group of dedicated anti-Leibniz conspirators, perhaps at the orders
of a powerful political figure—that all those copies of Leibniz’s works
disappeared? Gödel’s conspiracy theory might have been the product of a
paranoid mind, but its simplicity and parsimony cannot be denied.

2. Falsifiability
Douthat also tells us to avoid conspiracy theories with predetermined conclusions, a criterion that appears to be inspired by Karl
76

This preference for simplicity is often attributed to William of Ockham
(c.1287–1347), a Franciscan theologian and scholastic philosopher. See Schaffer
(2015), pp. 644-645. The phrase “Occam’s Razor,” however, did not appear until
several centuries after Ockham’s death in 1347.
77
The “razor” in the principle of Occam’s Razor thus refers to the “shaving
away” of unnecessary assumptions. Similarly, another way of formulating Occam’s
Razor is the idea that “entities are not to be multiplied without necessity” or non sunt
multiplicanda entia sine necessitate. This version of Occam’s Razor was originally
formulated by the Irish Franciscan philosopher John Punch in his 1639 commentary
on the works of Duns Scotus. See Sorenson (2011); Gibbs (1996). Either way, this
preference for simplicity may go as far back as Aristotle’s Physics, which states,
“Nature operates in the shortest way possible.” See Book V of Aristotle’s Physics,
quoted in Sorensen (2011), p. 262.
78
Yourgrau (2005), p. 182.
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Popper’s notion of falsifiability.79 For Popper, falsifiability refers to
“testability”—whether or not a particular proposition, statement, theory, or
hypothesis can tested and proven wrong, i.e., contradicted by evidence or
falsified. As such, Popper’s falsifiability test, which was originally
formulated by Popper to distinguish science from pseudo-science,80 would
also appear to be a useful technique for distinguishing plausible conspiracy
theories from imagined or invented ones.
Alas, to the extent most conspiracy theories are self-sealing or
immune from logic,81 Douthat’s second criterion is of limited use. To see
why, consider, yet again, the Gödel Conspiracy. According to Karl Menger
and Nicholas Rescher,82 Gödel refused to consider explanations of Leibniz’s
missing works that were perhaps more plausible than the existence of a
secret, centuries-long conspiracy. In other words, Gödel’s beliefs about this
alleged cover-up could not be falsified—no amount of contrary evidence
would have led Gödel to change his mind. Like Freudian psychoanalysts or
Marxist critics of capitalism, conspiracy theorists will update their priors in
favor of their pre-existing beliefs, especially when their priors are the product
of deep-seated intuitions and implicit assumptions about the world.83

3. Selectivity
Douthat’s last two rules of thumb can be combined into a single
criterion: selectivity. Specifically, Douthat tells us that just because one
particular fringe theory or myth might be true doesn’t mean all of them are,
and that we should take such theories or myths more seriously only when
“the mainstream narrative has holes.”84
Alas, this selectivity criterion is woefully inadequate for two reasons.
First off, all narratives, even mainstream or consensus ones, will always have
79

Karl Popper introduced the concept of falsifiability in his 1935 book Logik
der Forschung, which was further revised and translated into English in 1959 as The
Logic of Scientific Discovery.
80
See Resnik (2000).
81
See Sunstein & Vermuele (2009), pp. 204 & 207.
82
Menger (1994); Rescher (2011).
83
On this note, consider religious beliefs. Douthat himself concedes that “to be
a devout Christian or a believing Jew or Muslim is to be a bit like a conspiracy
theorist, in the sense that you believe that there is an invisible reality that secular
knowledge can’t recognize . . .” Douthat (2021). In other words, religious beliefs,
like many conspiracy theories, are usually the product of one’s private intuitions, not
rational deliberations, and these intuitions often reflect one’s most deeply-held
beliefs and thus cannot be tested or falsified in any meaningful sense.
84
Douthat (2021).
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gaps or holes in them. By definition, a narrative is a story, and all stories are
necessarily incomplete.85 More to the point, even a story with a single hole
or gap might be called into question, depending on the size of that gap or its
nature. The Gödel Conspiracy, for example, as far-fetched and implausible
as it may appear at first glance, nevertheless fills a major gap in Gödel’s
extensive and meticulous studies of Leibniz’s characteristica universalis: the
large number of missing works authored by Leibniz.
Secondly, Douthat’s selectivity criterion is unhelpful to the extent
most conspiracies are stochastically independent.86 That is, unless we are
considering overlapping conspiracies—i.e., conspiracies with similar goals
or with the same subset of members—the total number of conspiracy theories
one accepts as true has absolutely no bearing on the truth values of those
particular conspiracies.87 As a result, even if one were to follow Douthat’s
guidance and reserve one’s conspiracy thinking to belief in a single sinister
plot or behind-the-scenes cabal, the probability of that particular plot or cabal
being true would remain unaltered.
Again, the Gödel Conspiracy is instructive in this regard. Although
Gödel somehow believed that the disappearance of some of Leibniz’s works
was due to a secret centuries-long conspiracy, no evidence exists that Gödel
subscribed to any other conspiracy theory in his lifetime. Yet, this fact,
standing alone, has no bearing whatsoever on whether the Gödel Conspiracy
itself is true or not.
To sum up, Douthat’s theory-choice criteria are ultimately unhelpful,
while counter proposals ranging from reality czars to cognitive infiltrators
are either ineffectual or dangerous. What if we just allowed people to bet on
conspiracy theories instead?

VI.

A CONSPIRACY THEORY RETRODICTION MARKET88

This Article proposes the creation of a retrodiction market to resolve
85

See Aristotle’s Poetics.
Compare the principle of “independence” in probability theory: treat each
conspiracy theory separately as an independent event. But what about overlapping
conspiracies, i.e., conspiracies as dependent events? What other scholars’ writings
did the Leibniz conspirators destroy or hide from posterity?
87
Stated formally, two events are said to be independent in the probabilistic
sense if knowing that one event has occurred doesn’t change the probability of the
other event’s occurrence. See Russell & Norvig (2021), p. 397.
88
The Article will sketch a proof of concept or outline of my proposal. The
author intends to publish a more detailed betting market manifesto in a separate
86
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claims about conspiracy theories. Part VI.A makes some general
observations about the information-aggregation function of betting markets.
Next, Part VI.B sketches a proof of concept involving conspiracy theory
contracts. Lastly, Parts VI.C and VI.D identify and respond to some practical
and theoretical objections to retrodiction markets and to the marketplace of
ideas metaphor.

A. Betting on Conspiracies: General Observations
Why frame conspiracy theories as wagers or bets? Betting markets
or prediction markets already exist in many domains,89 and extending this
model to conspiracy theories would have a major advantage over reality
czars, social media censors, or cognitive infiltrators.90 Broadly speaking,
markets and prices aggregate disparate sources of information more
efficiently and accurately than most other institutions can because collective
decisions made by a group of people are generally more accurate than any
individual decision,91 or in the words of one proponent of prediction markets:
… when dealing with complex issues involving many
variables or moving parts, no one can claim to have a
complete model or theory from which to make fail-safe
predictions. More likely everyone has a partial
understanding of the situation, further clouded by his own
biases. But when all these partial, biased models are put
together … knowledge accumulates, gaps get filled, while
the various biases cancel each other.92
Furthermore, in addition to its information-aggregation function, a
retrodiction market in conspiracy theories would have several other
significant advantages. Specifically, such a market would provide financial

paper. See Guerra-Pujol (forthcoming). Although the details and design of the
proposed retrodiction market are still open for discussion, the author respectfully
asks the reader to keep an open mind, especially since markets often evolve by trial
and error. See generally McMillan (2002).
89
See Mann (2016), for an example of a betting market in the movie industry.
See Hanson (2006) for an example of a terrorism futures market. Unlike most
prediction markets, however, the retrodiction market proposed here would involve
only past events, like 9/11 or the JFK assassination, not future events.
90
See Part V.A, supra.
91
In addition to Hayek (1945), see Landemore & Elster (2012); Page (2007);
Surowiecki (2005).
92
Hypermind (n.d.). I thank my colleague and friend Paras Chopra for bringing
this source to my attention via Twitter. See Chopra (2018).
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and reputational incentives to place winning bets,93 scale well with the
number of bettors and opinions,94 and generate unambiguous outputs that are
easy to measure, since the overall success of the retrodiction market could be
measured in terms of the number of participants in the market and the volume
of trades.

B. Conspiracy Theory Contracts
A conspiracy theory retrodiction market would enable bettors to buy
or sell conspiracy theory contracts. Each contract could be structured as a
simple statement with two possible outcomes: true (T) or false (F). Bettors
would then be able to buy such T or F contracts depending on whether they
believed the betting market’s aggregate answer to the specific conspiracy
theory being bet on—i.e., whether the conspiracy will turn out to be more
likely true or false. Anyone who disagrees with the current consensus about
a disputed conspiracy theory contract would have a profit motive to
participate in the market.
By way of illustration, if some bettors believe that Lee Harvey
Oswald was part of a conspiracy or that 9/11 was an inside job,95 they could
buy T contracts on these topics, and conversely, if other bettors think that
Oswald indeed acted alone or that 9/11 was not an inside job, bettors could
buy F contracts. The prices of these bets would then be based on supply on
demand, depending on how many bettors buy T or F contracts. If more bettors
believe Oswald was part of a conspiracy, the price of the T contract will rise,
while if more bettors believe Oswald acted alone, the price of the F contract
will rise. Furthermore, the more participants or bets there are, the more likely
that prices will reflect the true probabilities of the various conspiracy theories
being bet on.96
Moreover, other creative design possibilities are also possible.
Instead of funding another ad hoc study, a university or grant institution
might consider sponsoring its own retrodiction market by allocating fullytransferable cash-value tokens to a select group of academics, pundits, and
other experts to encourage them to place conspiracy-theory bets.97 However
93

See generally Teall (2018), ch. 11.
See generally Roche (2017); see also Sztorc (2015a).
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See, e.g., Fetzer (2007).
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See Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2006).
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the retrodiction market is designed, it is possible to imagine people placing
bets on any number of disputed conspiracy theories, with the going odds or
prices of the bets based on the current academic or popular consensus. Either
way, bettors—laymen and experts alike—would have to either “put up or
shut up” by supporting their claims with real money.98

C. Practical Objections
One practical objection to this proposed market is that conspiracy
theories generally refer to past events, like the JFK assassination, 9/11, or the
election of 2020. The objection here is that one cannot use a prediction
market to predict the past. This objection, however, is irrelevant. Betting
markets are versatile and can be used for a wide variety of purposes beyond
forecasting.99 But the most serious practical objection to my proposal is, Who
Decides? Who will be the arbiter of the truth or falsity of the conspiracy
theory contracts being bet on? Who will decide whether a particular
conspiracy theory is true or whether a particular claim or allegation is “fake
news”? Also, in commenting on a previous draft of this paper, Professor
Steven J. Brams identified another serious problem with retrodiction
markets: the problem of timing.100 Specifically, when would a decision,
either for or against a given conspiracy theory, be made?
So, why not just keep the conspiracy theory market open
indefinitely?101 This simple and elegant solution solves both the decision
problem—who decides whether a given conspiracy theory is true?—and the
timing problem—when is this decision to be made?—or in the words of
Professor Brams, “Any bettor could opt out at any time, pocketing his
winnings if the current price is above what he paid for his bet (either for or
against the conspiracy) or taking a loss at the current price.”102

(2016). Also, following Hanson (2008), one could also imagine that, instead of
funding their research exclusively through cumbersome and slow National Science
Foundation or Ford Foundation grants, academics could fund their research with the
winnings from their conspiracy theory bets.
98
Or in the more memorable words of my colleague and friend Alex Tabarrok
(2012), “A bet is a tax on bullshit.”
99
See generally Sztorc (2015b). Among other things, betting markets can be
used to financial services, such as risk-management and the funding of public goods;
in addition, betting markets can be used to detect lies, encourage whistleblowers, and
provide decision makers with honest advice. Ibid.
100
Brams (2021).
101
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By keeping the betting market open indefinitely, the price of any
given conspiracy theory contract will track belief or non-belief in the
conspiracy, with no necessary final resolution. A bettor will stay in the
market if he thinks the price of his conspiracy theory contract will increase,
or he will opt out if he thinks it will fall. Additionally, bettors would have an
incentive to seek new information that not only supports their choices but is
also likely to persuade other bettors, thereby advancing the search for truth.
As long as there is yet-to-be-discovered evidence that may be convincing to
some bettors, some conspiracy theories should move toward resolution
without the need for an omniscient arbiter.

D. Theoretical Objections
Although the political economist Ronald Coase famously concluded
that no fundamental difference exists between the market for goods and the
market for ideas,103 many legal scholars and other intellectuals have rejected
this analogy. After all, if truth is supposed to prevail when ideas are shared
freely and openly, why are bogus conspiracy theories so popular? Alvin
Goldman and James Cox, for example, conclude that the marketplace
analogy is inapt in the domain of speech because “it is really questionable
whether messages are goods or products at all,”104 while Robert Sparrow and
Robert Gooding concur that “ideas are not commodities of the sort ordinarily
bought and sold in markets”105 and propose an alternative metaphor: “the
garden of ideas.”106 Similarly, Gregory Brazeal emphasizes “structural
dissimilarities between a market in more traditional goods and a market in
ideas.”107
Others, however, have rejected the marketplace of ideas metaphor
with respect to specific types of speech, such as hate speech and racist
speech—an objection that could be extended to conspiracy theories. David
Shih, for example, citing the landmark work of Richard Delgado and Jane
Stefancic,108 focuses on hate speech and racist speech and concludes that the
marketplace of ideas fails in these domains because “we cannot make
objective choices about racism.”109 Why not? Because, according to the
103

Coase (1974).
Goldman & Cox (1996), p. 26.
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aforementioned Delgado and Stefancic, “racism is woven into the warp and
woof of the way we see and organize the world ….”110 Likewise, to the extent
conspiracy theories are such a pervasive feature of life that not even the great
logician Kurt Gödel was immune to them, the same logic might apply to
conspiracy thinking as well.
Yet others have rejected the market metaphor with respect to specific
types of information environments, such as social media. Claudio Lombardi,
for example, explains how the marketplace of ideas is distorted by the
advertising revenue models of social media platforms like Twitter and
Facebook.111 In brief, these Internet platforms treat news as a “product” and
potential readers as “consumers” and thus distort the marketplace of ideas by
lumping reliable sources of news together with fake news.112 In Lombardi’s
words: “Algorithms such as those used by Facebook and Twitter are crafted
… to show online content without selecting for the credibility of the source.
The watchword is instead the ‘effectiveness’ of a post in generating traffic—
a loophole that populist movements have used very effectively.”113
But how persuasive are these criticisms of the marketplace of ideas?
After all, conspiracy theories have flourished even before the rise of social
media platforms,114 and in any case, Lombardi’s analysis is already

110

Delgado & Stefancic (1992), p. 1278.
See Lombardi (2019).
112
For additional analyses of the role of social media in promoting conspiracy
thinking, see Rogers & Mithani (2021), who identify social media exposure, along
with various “cognitive quirks,” as a cause of conspiracy theories, and Bak-Coleman,
et al. (2021), who use a “global collective behavior” framework to identify new
dangers posed by social media to “scientific progress, democracy, and actions to
address global crises.” See also Ghaffary (2021).
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Ibid., p. 201. Lombardi, however, falls into the ad hominem trap when he
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due to . . . bounded rationality and cognitive limitations.” Ibid., pp. 202-203.
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According to Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, the amount of
“conspiracy talk” does not correlate with advances in technology or with changing
economic conditions; to the contrary, conspiracy theorizing overall has, in fact,
declined since the 1980s, in spite of the rise of social media platforms. See generally
Uscinski & Parent (2014). See also van Prooijen & Douglas (2017), pp. 324-325.
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outdated.115 By contrast, Shih’s analysis is pessimistic,116 and more
importantly, it misses an even larger point: a retrodiction market in
conspiracy theories could effectively help counter our inability to make
objective information choices by promoting cognitive diversity.117 If there
were a retrodiction market, anyone who disagrees with the current consensus
about a particular conspiracy theory would have a profit motive to place a
bet.

VII.

CONCLUSION

To sum up the central questions posed by this Article, How could a
thinker as logical and rigorous as Kurt Gödel engage in conspiracy thinking,
and what is the least dangerous way of responding to conspiracy believers,
a solution that doesn’t stifle the marketplace of ideas or democratic values?
In place of another ad hoc study, this Article proposed a conspiracy theory
retrodiction market. Simply put, such a betting market is more likely to
succeed in countering the negative effects of conspiracy thinking than other
proposed methods—e.g., appointment of a reality czar; cognitive infiltration
of groups that promote conspiracy theories; or further tweaking of secret
social media algorithms—because betting markets aggregate information

115

As of this writing (January of 2022), several social media platforms and Big
Tech firms have already announced voluntary measures to combat fake news and the
spread of conspiracy theories. Google Search, for example, has announced that it will
be attaching warning labels to search results involving topics that are “rapidly
evolving” and in which “a range of sources hasn’t yet weighed in” (see Sullivan,
2021), while Twitter has already been attaching warnings to Tweets containing
“synthetic and manipulated media” and “misleading information” about COVID-19.
See Roth & Achutan (2020); Roth & Pickles (2020). See also Ortutay (2021). For its
part, Facebook has undertaken efforts to “reduce the distribution of fake news” by
deleting misleading posts altogether and through stricter enforcement of its contentmoderation policies. See Lyons (2018); see also Meta (2021). (As an aside, according
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behest of law enforcement agencies.) In any case, one problem with these various
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well as the complete lack of transparency regarding the Who Decides? question.
Specifically, who decides the truth-values of social media posts or search results?
See Part VI.C, supra.
116
Also, if Shih were correct about our inability to make objective information
choices, then everyone must be irredeemably racist or susceptible to conspiracy
narratives, and no amount of public policy reforms would alter this sad state of
affairs.
117
See Hypermind (n.d.). See generally Page (2007); see also Suroweicki
(2005).
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more effectively, efficiently, and ethically than these other top-down
methods can.
To conclude, consider the following observation by the late Milton
Friedman on the general topic of governance: “The important thing is to …
make it politically profitable for the wrong people to do the right thing.”118
This logic applies to retrodiction markets as well. Although we cannot always
know the truth about past events, perhaps we can make it profitable for
people to believe in those conspiracy claims that are more likely than not to
be true. By allowing people to place bets on disputed conspiracy theories, the
truth-value of any given conspiracy claim will be aggregated and reflected in
the price of a bet, so bettors as whole could better distinguish between real
conspiracies and imagined ones, between truth and lies.
***

118

See Friedman (n.d.); see also Kim (2013).
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